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Bank panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the 
United States until the 1930s. Between 1864 and 1933, 
there were seven instances of systemwide runs on 
banks, and four of these led to widespread suspension 
of convertibility of deposits into currency.
1 Since 1933, 
however, while there have been runs on individual 
banks, there have been no bank panics. This turnaround 
has been widely attributed to deposit insurance and 
close regulation of banking. If this accomplishment had 
come at little or no social cost, a study of bank panics 
would be of purely historical interest, with no relevance 
for contemporary policy. But the recent experiences of 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have 
decisively shown that deposit insurance is not costless. 
A major problem with deposit insurance is known as 
moral hazard (Kareken and Wallace 1978; Kareken 
1981,1983; Kane 1985;Benston et al. 1986; Boyd and 
Rolnick 1989). When bank deposits are insured, de-
positors have no incentive to monitor their banks' 
activities. Consequently, banks can, without penalty 
and with the possibility of greater profit, hold riskier 
portfolios than they otherwise might. This distortion in 
banks' asset choices can be mitigated by regulation and 
monitoring by the central bank and the deposit insur-
ance agencies. The obvious argument against close 
regulation is that unfettered markets can allocate 
resources better than bureaucrats can. Therefore, the 
benefits of deposit insurance (such as eliminating bank 
panics) must be balanced against the costs of distorting 
bank decisions. In order to evaluate these costs and 
benefits, we need a model, or framework, within which 
to evaluate alternative policies. 
Such a model must explain why there were bank 
panics in the United States until the 1930s. Neither 
Great Britain nor Canada had federal deposit insur-
ance, and neither experienced systemwide bank runs as 
the United States did in the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies. Clearly, then, deposit insurance is not the only 
arrangement that forestalls bank panics. Given this fact, 
it is desirable to have a model which is consistent with 
the sharp differences in the performance of the banking 
system in such similar economies as those of the United 
States, Great Britain, and Canada. 
A promising route is to ask whether specific institu-
tional arrangements between 1864 and 1933 contrib-
uted to bank panics. I will focus on the National Bank-
ing System in the United States from 1864 to 1913. 
I argue that two key features of this system played a 
large role in bank panics. One is that banks were 
prohibited from branching between states and, to a 
substantial extent, within states. The other key feature is 
that banks were permitted to meet their reserve require-
ments partly by deposits at national banks in designated 
11 follow Sprague (1910) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in identifying 
bank panics in 1873,1884, 1890, 1893, 1907, 1930, and 1933. Convertibility 
was suspended in 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1933. 
3 reserve cities. Prohibiting interstate banking meant that 
banks were subject to community-specific variations in 
the demand for currency and could not diversify this 
risk by issuing deposits directly in other communities. 
Permitting reserves to be held as deposits in other banks 
had a subtler and more insidious effect. Such reserves 
could earn interest as banks in reserve cities reloaned 
them. However, in order to earn the interest demanded 
in a competitive marketplace, banks in the reserve cities 
held illiquid portfolios. The system as a whole thus held 
a more illiquid portfolio than it might have otherwise. 
The effect was to create a system prone to bank panics. 
In this paper, I construct a model that is consistent 
with the institutional features of the U.S. National Bank-
ing System. My model builds on the work of Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), Smith (1986), Bhattacharya and 
Gale (1987), and Wallace (1988) and explains why 
panics occurred in the United States but not in Great 
Britain or Canada. Essentially, this is because, unlike 
the United States, the other countries had no prohibi-
tions on interstate branching. Some may argue that, 
without such prohibitions, the banking industry would 
become too concentrated,
2 so that other panic-preven-
tion measures, such as deposit insurance, might be 
preferred. But my model suggests that bank panics can 
be eliminated without removing the prohibitions on 
interstate branching. I argue that a combination of 
effective reserve requirements, a wise discount window 
policy by the central bank, and a policy of occasionally 
restricting cash payments can eliminate bank panics. 
In other words, to be stable, the banking system does 
not need deposit insurance. That's good news for those 
concerned about the moral hazard problems of deposit 
insurance. It means a stable banking system can also 
be efficient.
3 
The plan of the paper is as follows. First I describe 
the National Banking System and its bank panics. Then 
I build a series of progressively more complicated 
models to arrive at one which captures the key features 
of that system. Next I describe these models more 
formally (in a section which readers not interested in 
technical details can skip without loss of continuity). 
And finally, I summarize the paper and draw policy 
implications. 
Bank Panics Under 
the National Banking System 
To review the major bank panics under the U.S. 
National Banking System, I rely heavily on Sprague's 
(1910) history of these crises. Sprague was a leading 
contemporary authority on bank panics. For the Na-
tional Monetary Commission, he wrote a history of the 
panics under the National Banking System. Sprague's 
carefully documented work has been extensively used 
and cited, by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), among 
others. Sprague discusses five panics, which occurred 
in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907. In 1873, 1893, 
and 1907, suspension of convertibility was widespread. 
The most serious of these crises was in 1907 and led to 
the formation of the Federal Reserve System. 
The System 
Before I discuss the crises, I briefly review the main 
features of the National Banking System. The National 
Banking Act of 1864 set restrictions on banks chartered 
under it. These included restrictions on their branch-
ing, their capital and reserves, and their portfolios. 
My primary interest is in the branching and reserve 
restrictions. (For a general discussion of the U.S. Nation-
al Banking System, see White 1983.) The National 
Banking Act prohibited branching across state lines 
(interstate branching), and state legislatures generally 
prohibited branching within a state (intrastate branch-
ing). Reserve requirements varied according to a bank's 
location. Banks in nine designated reserve cities had to 
hold a reserve of 25 percent of their deposits, and those 
elsewhere (country banks) had to hold 15 percent of 
theirs. Two-fifths of a country bank's reserves had to be 
held as currency and specie in their vaults, and up to 
three-fifths could be held as deposits in reserve city 
banks. In 1874, a three-tier system was established 
under which banks in eighteen new reserve cities could 
hold one-half of their required reserves as deposits in 
banks in New York, the central reserve city. In 1887, 
the law was changed yet again, and Chicago and St. 
Louis became central reserve cities. From my perspec-
tive, it is important to note that a substantial portion of 
the reserves held by country banks were, effectively, 
loans due from other banks. 
Deposits at reserve city banks served several im-
portant purposes. When country banks had excess 
funds, these could be deposited with city banks and earn 
2The number of banks per capita was substantially smaller in Canada than 
in the United States. See the paper by Williamson in this issue of the Quarterly 
Review. 
3Stability can, of course, be achieved in many ways, but unlike my way, 
most others cannot also achieve efficiency. A 100 percent reserve requirement, 
for example, proposed by Friedman (1960), would likely eliminate bank panics. 
Such a proposal, however, ignores the fact that banks provide (and perhaps 
ought to provide) services other than facilitating transactions. One of those 
services is transforming illiquid assets into liquid claims. Since my model has an 
explicit role for banks in providing liquidity, it can be used to analyze stability 
and efficiency simultaneously. 
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interest. They also allowed banks to clear claims 
against one another. Perhaps most importantly, in a unit 
banking (no branching) system, they allowed country 
banks to hold a more diversified portfolio of assets. 
However, allowing these deposits to count toward 
reserve requirements led to a system which was more 
illiquid than was apparent. 
The Panics 
I turn now to the bank panics themselves. Rather than 
review them chronologically, I will describe the key 
features I think they shared. 
• Duration 
The panics were generally short, lasting from one to 
three months. The longest was in 1907; the shortest, in 
1884. 
• Timing 
Most of the panics occurred in the fall of the year. As 
Sprague remarks (1910, p. 127), "With few exceptions 
all our crises... have occurred in the autumn, when the 
western banks, through the sale of the cereal crops, 
were in a position to withdraw large sums of money 
from the East." A more accurate interpretation, I think, 
is that the demand for currency in agricultural areas 
fluctuated seasonally, being particularly high in the 
spring and fall. This view is supported by the fact that 
the deposits of country banks in New York were 
generally low in the spring, rose in the summer, and fell 
to their lowest level in October (Sprague 1910, p. 22). 
Of course, the magnitude of this seasonal movement 
was not predictable. 
• Proximate Cause 
Contemporary observers viewed the loss of confidence 
in banks as originating in the failure of one or more 
financial institutions in New York City. Sprague (1910, 
pp. 49, 110, 142, 164, 252) cites these failures: 1873, 
Jay Cooke & Co.; 1884, Grant & Ward; 1890, Decker, 
Howell, & Co.; 1893, the National Cordage Company; 
1907, the Knickerbocker Trust Company. Of course, 
none of the observers mentioned the many failures 
during the period which did not lead to panics, so it is 
difficult to judge the importance of this view. 
• Response of the Banking System 
When banks perceived that a crisis was coming, they 
turned to their clearinghouses to set up a mechanism to 
protect themselves. The particular mechanism they 
resorted to was the issuing of clearinghouse loan 
certificates. Clearinghouses issued these certificates 
against securities deposited by banks. (See Gorton 
1985 and Gorton and Mullineaux 1987 for a more 
detailed description of the role of the clearinghouses.) 
For example, in 1873, banks in the New York 
Clearing House Association issued the following state-
ment: "Any bank in the Clearing House Association 
may, at its option, deposit with a committee of five 
persons, to be appointed for that purpose, an amount 
of bills receivable or other securities, . . . [and] said 
committee . . . shall be authorized to issue . . . certifi-
cates of deposit bearing interest at 7 per cent per annum 
... to an amount not in excess of 75 per cent of the 
securities" (Sprague 1910, p. 45). The committee was 
also authorized to issue certificates up to par value 
against U.S. government bonds or gold. These certifi-
cates could be used to settle unfavorable balances at the 
clearinghouse. 
In effect, clearinghouses attempted to act as a central 
bank might have. While they could not issue legal 
tender, they attempted to go as far as they could in that 
direction. 
Until the panic of 1893, these certificates were used 
solely in interbank settlements. However, in the panics 
of 1893 and 1907, loan certificates were issued in small 
denominations by banks to their customers. These 
small-denomination certificates were, in turn, backed 
by large-denomination clearinghouse certificates. This 
issue of paper money was clearly illegal, but the federal 
government looked the other way. These currency 
substitutes were issued in relatively large amounts. For 
example, at the height of the 1907 crisis, in December, 
$750 million of clearinghouse instruments of various 
types were issued. This is a large amount compared to 
the stock of currency and reserves, which was $3,069 
million (White 1983, p. 79). 
Toward the end of the National Banking System 
period, financial innovations made it more difficult for 
clearinghouses to coordinate actions among financial 
institutions. The most important of these innovations 
was the formation of trust companies. The trust com-
panies received deposits of money in trust to purchase 
securities of business firms and generally engaged in 
a variety of banking activities. The assets of these 
companies grew rapidly in the last 20 years of the 
National Banking System period (White 1983, pp. 
38-40), primarily because they were subject to lower 
reserve requirements. In 1903, however, the New York 
Clearing House Association adopted a rule which 
required trust companies clearing through its member 
banks to increase their reserves. Rather than meet that 
5 condition, nearly all the trust companies gave up clear-
inghouse privileges. 
The most important exception was the Knicker-
bocker Trust Company. When this company ran into 
difficulties in 1907, it sought a loan from its clearing 
agent, the National Bank of Commerce. When that 
bank refused to make the loan, a run on the trust com-
pany began which rapidly spread to all the banks. 
Sprague (1910, p. 252) argues forcefully that if Knick-
erbocker had been a bank and a member of the clearing-
house, it would have received a loan and the crisis been 
averted. 
Note the parallel here with arguments today that 
financial innovation outside the purview of the Federal 
Reserve System endangers the financial system as a 
whole. But remember, it is far from established that 
the failure of one financial institution necessarily en-
dangers the entire system. 
• Suspension of Convertibility 
As pointed out earlier, not every panic led to a 
suspension of the convertibility of deposits into cur-
rency. But in 1873,1893, and 1907, the clearinghouses 
judged conditions serious enough to suspend conver-
sion. The suspension was carried out, for example, 
in 1873 when the New York Clearing House Associa-
tion adopted the following resolution: "That all checks 
when certified by any bank shall be first stamped 
or written 'Payable through the Clearing House' " 
(Sprague 1910, p. 54). This resolution did not mean that 
no cash payments would be made, but it did place the 
decision to pay currency firmly with the clearinghouse 
committee. Still, suspension was never quite complete. 
Generally, banks were allowed to issue limited amounts 
of currency to depositors and to employers to meet 
payrolls. 
• Currency Premium 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the panics 
documented by Sprague is the size of the currency 
premium. When banks suspended payment, money 
brokers set up business in every major city, offering to 
buy and sell currency at a premium for deposits. These 
premia were quoted in the newspapers, and Sprague 
collected them. The size of these premia is one 
indication of the severity of the crises. In 1873, the 
premium averaged 1 percent; in 1893 and 1907, it 
averaged 2 percent (Sprague 1910, pp. 57, 187, 280). 
On no date did it exceed 4 percent. Since depositors 
could obtain currency simply by selling their deposits to 
brokers, the currency premium reflects the wealth lost 
by depositors. 
• Effect on Real Activity 
Bank panics do not affect financial institutions alone. 
The resulting contraction in loans, as well as the diffi-
culty of securing currency to meet payrolls and make 
transactions, may also have serious effects on the 
nonfinancial sectors of the economy. But the post-
World War II experience should convince us that 
eliminating bank panics does not eliminate business 
cycles. There is some evidence that fluctuations in 
economic activity were not dramatically larger before 
World War II than after (Romer 1989). Furthermore, 
there is reason to believe that bank panics do not cause 
recessions (Gorton 1988). 
However, examining the behavior of real activity 
during panics is still interesting. Generally, real activity 
declined fairly substantially. For example, during the 
1873 panic, loans by national banks fell 9 percent 
(Sprague 1910, p. 83). In the panic of 1907, though, 
these loans fell only 2 percent (Sprague 1910, pp. 305, 
308,310). 
• Contemporary Policy Implications 
In 1873, the New York Clearing House Association 
formed a committee to recommend policy changes 
"to increase the security of . . . business" (Sprague 
1910, p. 91). The main reform suggested by the com-
mittee was to prohibit the payment of interest on 
deposits. I suspect that the main reason for this rec-
ommendation was to form a cartel to eliminate price 
competition. Of course, the committee did not openly 
use that argument. Instead, it pointed out that "currency 
is superabundant in summer . . . and can not . . . [be 
kept] idle without loss of the interest paid to its owners 
. . . .There is consequently no resource but to loan it in 
Wall street upon stocks and bonds, in doing which so 
much of the nation's movable capital passes for the time 
into fixed and immovable forms of investment and its 
essential character is instantly changed" (Sprague 
1910, p. 92). In effect, the committee argued that com-
petitive forces drive the system to more illiquidity than 
is socially optimal. 
But why should this be so? Surely, depositors can 
avoid banks which have illiquid portfolios if they want 
to. The committee had a response to this argument: 
"The abandonment of the practice of paying interest 
upon deposits will remove a great inducement to divide 
. . . reserves between cash in hand and deposits in cities, 
and make the banks throughout the country what they 
should always be, financial outposts to strengthen the 
general situation" (Sprague 1910, p. 97). Here we may 
see the one valid argument for prohibiting the payment 
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of interest on deposits. The payment of interest effec-
tively encouraged banks to evade reserve requirements. 
As the committee argued, "The aggregate [reserves] 
held by all the national banks of the United States does 
not finally much exceed 10 per cent of their direct 
liabilities, without reference to the large amount of debt 
which is otherwise dependent upon the same reserves" 
(Sprague 1910, pp. 96-97). If the committee was right, 
the actual reserves fell far short of the statutory re-
quirement. 
The recommendations of the 1873 committee went 
largely unheeded. Similar recommendations were 
made and ignored in subsequent panics until Congress 
reformed the system in 1913. 
Modeling Banking Informally ... 
Now I construct a series of progressively more compli-
cated models, ending with one which captures the key 
features of the National Banking System. I build very 
heavily on Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) model, which 
itself has two key features.
4 One is that individuals are 
uncertain about when they will want to make expendi-
tures. The other is that real investments yield high 
returns over long horizons, but low returns if they are 
liquidated early. 
The Diamond and Dybvig Model 
I begin by describing my version of Diamond and 
Dybvig's model. This model has three periods, which 
I refer to as the planning period (period 0), the inter-
mediate period (period 1), and tht final period (period 
2). There are TV people in the economy. In the planning 
period, each person is endowed with one unit of a 
good—say, seed corn. There are two technologies avail-
able. One I call illiquid. Using this technology, people 
plant seed corn in the planning period. Part or all of it 
can be dug up and eaten in the intermediate period, 
when it yields a rate of return of one unit. The remainder 
grows at rate R > 1 into the final period. The other 
technology I call liquid. With this technology, a unit of 
investment also yields a unit of output in the intermedi-
ate period. Part or all of it can be consumed then, and 
the remainder yields a rate of return of only one unit 
into the final period. This technology is clearly domi-
nated by the illiquid technology. Since the liquid 
technology plays a role only in my discussion of reserve 
requirements, I suppress it until then. 
The economy has two kinds of people: impatient and 
patient. Impatient people want to consume in the 
intermediate period. Patient people are indifferent 
about consumption in the intermediate and final 
periods; that is, they are indifferent to a choice between 
consuming one unit in period 1 or one unit in period 2. 
No one knows in the planning period whether any 
particular person will be impatient or patient. Each 
person believes that the probability of being impatient 
is t. Therefore, if the number of people in the economy 
is large, tN will be impatient and (1—0/V will be patient. 
Individuals learn their own type in the intermediate 
period. 
Consider, now, the problem facing this society in the 
planning period. One possibility is autarky; each person 
could act alone. Each person could then look forward to 
consuming one unit in the intermediate period (if 
impatient) or R units in the final period (if patient). Note 
that, because R > 1, no patient people would consume 
early. However, everybody might be better off if they 
pool their resources, in an insurance arrangement, for 
example. Suppose everybody agreed that impatient 
people are entitled to consume more than one unit 
(say, xx units each) in the intermediate period and 
patient people to share the remaining proceeds in the 
final period. The amount, x2, received by each patient 
person is, then, given by 
(1) N(\-t)x2 = R(N-tNx{) 
where the term in the parentheses on the right is what is 
left over in period 1 after the impatient are paid off. 
Alternatively, we can rewrite equation (1) as 
(2) x2 = R(l-tx{)/(l-t). 
Note from equation (2) that if x{ > 1, then x2< R. An 
insurance arrangement might be preferred to autarky 
because people are willing to forgo some of their 
consumption if they turn out to be patient in return for 
greater consumption if they turn out to be impatient. 
The precise insurance contract entered into depends, of 
course, on the preferences of the two types and on the 
value of t. Under reasonable restrictions on people's 
attitudes toward risk, it can be shown that an optimal 
contract has the following properties: 
(3) \ <xx<x2 
(4) x2/xx < R. 
4My description of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) model closely follows 
that of Wallace (1988), who develops a detailed, useful, and entertaining 
analogy with a camping trip. My description is, therefore, brief. 
7 How might the society described here implement 
this contract? The following scenario might help. In the 
planning period, everybody plants corn in a common 
field. The society has access to a programmable robot 
which guards the field and can harvest the corn. The 
robot also provides services similar to a cash machine. 
That is, in the intermediate period, people arrive 
randomly, and the robot gives jc, units to each person 
who demands corn in that period. The robot records the 
identity of each person who withdraws and pays all 
others x2 units in the final period. 
Given these rules, turn now to behavior in the 
intermediate period. Impatient people are best off 
consuming in this period and so will arrive at the field to 
collect their shares. Patient people's problem is some-
what more delicate. If any individual patient person 
believes that no other patient people will show up, then 
that person is best off waiting to consume in the final 
period, since x2 > xx. (Recall that patient people care 
equally about consumption in the two periods.) Such 
outcomes are described as individually incentive com-
patible, since no individual has an incentive to deviate 
from the rules of the game. However, what if a patient 
person believes that all other patient people intend to 
show up in the intermediate period? Since JC, > 1, if that 
happened, then not all the claims could be met in the 
intermediate period and, more important, there would 
be no seed corn in the final period. So any individual 
patient person is best off showing up at the field in the 
intermediate period and hoping to be early enough in 
line to get some consumption rather than none; that is, 
patient people are best off acting as if they were 
impatient. The point is that this story has potential for 
explaining bank panics. The fear that everybody might 
withdraw early is enough to cause everybody to want to 
withdraw early. 
But we should proceed slowly. An exceedingly 
simple mechanism could prevent bank panics. Suppose 
we program the robot to pay jCj units to the first tN 
people who show up in the intermediate period and 
nothing to anyone else who shows up in that period. 
Such a mechanism resembles suspension of converti-
bility of deposits into currency, a widespread practice 
throughout the National Banking System period. With 
the rules of the game augmented by suspension, 
impatient people would still show up in the inter-
mediate period to claim xx units of consumption. What 
about the patient? Regardless of any individual patient 
person's beliefs about the actions of other patient 
people, that person is assured of x2 units in the final 
period. Since x2> xx, early withdrawal never pays off 
for a patient person. Therefore, no phenomenon re-
sembling bank panics can possibly occur. 
I now list the key properties and implications of this 
model. 
One is that suspension of convertibility never occurs. 
The mere threat to suspend is enough to ensure that no 
patient people will withdraw early. 
Also, the model explains why banks hold illiquid 
portfolios. Since xx > 1, short-term deposits have higher 
yields than the technology permits. Therefore, not all 
deposits can be paid off. The cost of these high, early 
payments is that x2 < R, so that long-lived deposits have 
lower yields than the technology permits. People will-
ingly accept these relatively low, late returns for 
relatively high, early returns. We could, of course, 
require that xx — 1 and x2 = R; such a policy is tech-
nologically feasible, but undesirable. 
In addition, as Jacklin (1987) and Wallace (1988) 
have emphasized, the arrangement described in the 
model is inconsistent with well-functioning asset 
markets in the intermediate period. To see why this is 
so, suppose that, with such an arrangement in place, one 
person deviates in the planning period and plants corn 
autarkically. If that person turns out to be patient, then 
the return in the final period is R, which is greater than 
x2. If the person turns out to be impatient, then all the 
person needs to do is contact a patient person who is 
part of the arrangement and offer the following trade: 
Go to the robot, withdraw your deposits, and give them 
to me in exchange for my cornfield. A patient person 
would be more than willing to make such a trade since 
the person's return in the final period would then be R 
units, which is greater than x2. The impatient person 
would receive xx units, which is greater than the crop 
currently available. Therefore, the model's arrange-
ment is viable only if certain kinds of asset markets 
function poorly. 
However, the assumption that asset markets do not 
exist should not disturb us too much. As Wallace (1988, 
p. 16) argues, "Inconsistency between banking, on the 
one hand, and well-functioning markets, on the other, 
should not be surprising. Almost any story about the 
role of banking has implicit in it that markets are costly 
to participate in or are incomplete in some way." One 
specific way to model incompleteness of markets, as 
Wallace does, is to assume that people are isolated from 
each other in the intermediate period. (I return to this 
theme below.) 
Finally, the result that threatened suspension elim-
inates all bank panics is surely too strong. It appears to 
rely on the assumption that a fixed fraction t of people 
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are impatient. What if this fraction were, instead, 
random, so that uncertainty, or risk, enters the model in 
an aggregate sense? Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have 
argued that a policy of suspension could lead to some 
impatient people not consuming in the intermediate 
period and is therefore undesirable. They argued that 
when the fraction of impatient people is random, 
payments to each depositor should be contingent on the 
total number of withdrawals in the intermediate period. 
But with an isolation assumption or a sequential service 
constraint taken seriously, payments to a person in the 
intermediate period cannot be made contingent on the 
number of future withdrawals. 
The Wallace Model 
Wallace (1988) made some headway in characterizing 
the optimal insurance contract when aggregate risk 
exists. I now provide a full characterization and show 
that, with random withdrawals, bank panics are pos-
sible and suspension does not eliminate them entirely. 
To construct a model with aggregate risk, I modify 
the environment more or less as Wallace did. Suppose 
that the number of impatient people in the population 
can take one of two values, txN or t2N, with t2>t x. The 
probability of each of these events is given by p , and p2, 
respectively. 
Consider, first, the case where, at the beginning of 
the intermediate period, everybody gets to know the 
state of the world; that is, whether the number of 
impatient people will be txN or t2N is public informa-
tion. What does the optimal contract look like? In 
general, making the same payments to impatient 
people in both states will be undesirable because the 
risks to be shared in the two states are different. So all 
we need do is program the robot to make payments 
contingent on the two states. Denote the payments in 
the two states (xx(tx), x2(tx)) and (xx(t2), x2(t2)). Under 
appropriate assumptions on preferences, these allo-
cations satisfy 
(5) 1 <xx(tx)<x2(tx)<R 
(6) x2(tx)/xx(tx) < R 
and 
(7) 1 <xx(t2)<x2(t2) < R 
(8) x2(t2)lxx{t2)<R. 
In effect, we solve for the optimal contract separately 
in the two states, just as we did in the economy without 
random withdrawals. Again, we can program our robot 
to suspend conversion just as in the nonrandom case. 
However, with a random number of withdrawers, the 
point at which suspension occurs is state-contingent: 
in state 1, convertibility is suspended after payments 
are made to txN withdrawers; in state 2, after payments 
are made to t2N withdrawers. Such a policy again 
avoids panics since in both states patient people get a 
higher return by waiting. 
Turn now to the case where the aggregate number of 
impatient people is not public information. In this case, 
when the first person shows up at the cornfield, the 
robot does not know whether tx or t2 has been realized. 
The robot must, therefore, be programmed to pay the 
same amount to the first person in both states. Similarly, 
if txN> 2, the robot does not know which state has been 
realized by the arrival of the second person. So the 
second person must get the same amount in both states. 
Of course, in principle, the amount received by the 
second person could be different from that received by 
the first person; we will show, though, that, in the 
optimal contract, these amounts are the same. In any 
event, the point is that payments to individuals can 
depend on the number of predecessors in line, but not on 
the number of successors. 
What does the optimal contract look like now? An 
equal amount is paid to the first txN withdrawers. Pay-
ing the same amount to such individuals in both states is 
desirable because people are risk averse in the model, 
and it is feasible. Risk aversion here simply means that 
people prefer constant consumption to a lottery which 
has the same average value. Since we can feasibly give 
everybody the average value of consumption, it is opti-
mal to do so. However, consider the problem we face 
when the next depositor shows up, the one after the first 
txN withdrawers. If we assume that only impatient 
people show up in the intermediate period, we know 
that the state is t2. If we pay this person the same amount 
as we paid the first txN withdrawers, we make the 
patient people worse off. In general, then, we will pay 
this person a different amount. Proceeding as we did 
earlier, we pay a constant amount to the remaining 
withdrawers, who number (t2~tx)N. 
The optimal contract is now characterized by four 
numbers. These are the amount paid to the first txN 
withdrawers, denoted jch; the amount paid to the next 
(t2—tx)N withdrawers, xX2\ the amount paid to patient 
people in the final period if tx has occurred, x2X; and 
the amount paid to patient people in the final period if 
t2 has occurred, x22. (Here the first subscript denotes 
the period; the second, the state.) 
9 Technological feasibility now requires that the con-
tract satisfy these conditions: 
(9) (N-t{N)x2l=R(N-t{Nxu) 
(10) (N-t2N)x22 = R[(N—t{Nxn) - (t2-tx)NxX2\ 
The term in the parentheses on the right side of equation 
(9) is the total amount of seed corn left after payments 
to the impatient in state 1. These resources grow by 
R into the final period, when they are distributed to 
the patient. Similarly, the term in brackets on the right 
side of equation (10) is the total payments to the 
impatient in state 2. Notice that the first tx impatient 
people are paid xu and the next t2 — tx are paid xx2. 
These resources, again augmented by R, are paid to 
patient people in the final period. 
Turn now to the individual incentive-compatibility 
conditions that an optimal contract must satisfy. Recall 
that with nonrandom withdrawals, the optimal contract 
satisfied x2 > xx and patient people never withdrew 
early. I set up the problem with random withdrawals as 
follows. At the beginning of the intermediate period, 
people must decide whether or not to visit the cornfield. 
If they decide to visit, they arrive there randomly. They 
see the current rate being paid for withdrawals and 
decide whether or not to withdraw. Obviously, the im-
patient will visit the cornfield and withdraw. What 
about the patient? If p2 is sufficiently small, then under 
the optimal contract, patient people are best off not 
visiting if they believe other patient people will not 
visit. Essentially, this is because, in the optimal contract, 
xn< jc21. (Note the similarity with the nonrandom 
case.) Since p2 is small, most of the time a patient per-
son receives a smaller amount by visiting and with-
drawing than by waiting until the final period. The 
optimal contract also has xX2< x22. Therefore, even if a 
patient person does visit, that person is best off not 
withdrawing. If the current payment is jcu, the patient 
person is best off waiting until the final period to 
withdraw, because most of the time the future payment 
will be higher. If the current payment is xx2, again the 
person is best off waiting. 
The optimal contract has several significant fea-
tures. First, as in the nonrandom case, here the arrange-
ment explains illiquid bank portfolios. Second, as is also 
true in the nonrandom case, this arrangement is incon-
sistent with well-functioning asset markets in the inter-
mediate period. Third, and the most questionable as-
pect of the model, here returns depend on the amount of 
prior withdrawals. Wallace (1988) has argued that this 
is consistent with partial suspension of convertibility. 
Historically, when conversion was suspended, limited 
withdrawals were usually allowed. Therefore, returns 
did depend on the withdrawer's position in line. From 
this perspective, the model can be interpreted as par-
tially suspending conversion after txN withdrawals. 
Wallace argues that, in this sense, the model is consist-
ent with observed institutional arrangements. However, 
I argue below that the assumption of large, aggregate 
fluctuations in the demand for currency is implausible. 
Are bank panics possible in this environment? 
Clearly, the optimal contract specifies suspension once 
t2N people have withdrawn. But what if a patient person 
sees a current return ofxxx and believes that everybody 
will attempt to withdraw? If the person is right, then 
waiting until the final period will bring the person x22 
instead of the xxx available immediately. If jcu is greater 
than x22, a patient person is obviously best off with-
drawing immediately. I show below that there are ex-
amples of economies in which, under the optimal con-
tract, xxx is greater than x22. Therefore, with suspen-
sion, bank panics are possible. 
Notice that, in the event of a panic, some of the 
impatient are left empty-handed. Being in line after t2N 
withdrawals have been made, they receive nothing in 
the intermediate period, which is when they want to 
consume. The bank panics, therefore, impose social 
costs: some people's consumption decisions are dis-
torted away from the desirable outcome. 
Note that beliefs about other people's actions are 
essential in generating the bad outcome. If any patient 
person believes no other patient people will withdraw, 
then that person is best off waiting and accepting the 
small odds of receiving a low future return. If a patient 
person believes all other patient people will withdraw, 
then immediate withdrawal is best. In this sense, the 
model captures the notion that panics are created by a 
lack of confidence in the banking system (here, a lack of 
confidence in the behavior of other depositors). 
Such panics can be avoided at a social cost. For 
example, we could suspend conversion after txN de-
positors have withdrawn. Since xxx < xx2, no patient 
people will withdraw early. However, some impatient 
people may not receive any payment in the interme-
diate period. Therefore, such an arrangement imposes 
a cost on society. The benefit is that bank panics are 
avoided. If the probability of the t2 state is small and that 
of a bank panic sufficiently large, a scheme of suspen-
sion after txN withdrawals may well dominate an ar-
rangement which ignores the possibility of runs. 
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Alternatively, we could design other contracts which 
eliminate bank panics. For example, we could choose 
a low value for jch and a higher value for x22. Such a 
contract avoids bank panics, but may well be undesir-
able since it forgoes the insurance benefits obtainable 
from the optimal contract. 
A Model With Community Risk 
The model with random withdrawals and aggregate 
risk described above has at least two implausible 
features. One is the assumption that the economy is 
subject to large swings in the desired amount of 
currency; the aggregate U.S. data, particularly since 
World War II, simply don't support that. The other 
implausible feature is the result that bank panics can be 
avoided only at a (possibly high) social cost. This is 
difficult to square with the apparently satisfactory 
performance of the banking industry in the United 
States for over 40 years since World War II—not to 
mention those of Great Britain and Canada throughout 
the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Still, the idea that the demand for currency can vary 
within communities is not implausible. In the second 
half of the 19th century, an important source of these 
variations was agriculture. The demand for farm loans 
rose during the planting season and fell at the harvest. 
Since cash was required for many farm transactions, the 
demand for currency in agricultural communities was 
high at both planting and harvesting times and low at 
other times of the year (Sprague 1910, pp. 19-20). 
Because of the prohibition of interstate branching, these 
community-specific fluctuations were also bank-
specific. 
I model the bank-specific fluctuations as follows. 
Suppose that there are a large number of communities, 
each of which looks exactly like the modified-Wallace 
environment with aggregate risk. That is, there are N 
people in each community, and the fraction of im-
patient people in each community can take on one of 
two values, tx or f2, with probabilities px and /^respec-
tively. However, because there are a large number of 
such communities, the aggregate economy does not 
have random withdrawals. That is, the fraction of the 
economy wide population who are impatient is t = pxtx 
+ p2t2. Therefore, if the communities could pool their 
resources, their collective economy would look exactly 
like the Diamond and Dybvig model. 
Assume, however, that there are barriers to such 
resource-pooling. Specifically, assume that people liv-
ing in any community can only plant corn there. (This 
assumption is meant to capture the idea that a Minne-
sotan would rather use a bank in Minnesota than one in 
Puerto Rico.) The robots can, though, transfer resources 
between cornfields in the intermediate and final peri-
ods. The model thus has an interbank borrowing and 
lending market. The information assumption within 
each community is exactly that made above: individ-
uals know only their own type. The information assump-
tions across communities are subtler. The fraction of 
early withdrawers in any community is unobservable by 
other communities. Furthermore, so are the payments 
to depositors. 
Given these information assumptions, what kinds of 
contracts will be offered to depositors? I claim that the 
contracts will be exactly the same as in the single-
community environment with aggregate risk. Note that 
offering such contracts is feasible. Now suppose that 
some other contract were offered. The results will be 
the same under any mechanism, but they are clearest if 
we simply assume that communities can borrow and 
lend from each other in the intermediate period at some 
interest rate r. I claim that r — R. Suppose, by way of 
contradiction, that r<R. Then no community with a 
realization of tx will lend because, by retaining the corn 
in the ground, it gets a larger return. Suppose that r > R. 
The same argument tells us that then no community 
will borrow. Therefore, r must equal R. But if this is true, 
then no community can do better than it does by acting 
autarkically. In other words, optimal contracts are 
likely to display features resembling bank panics. 
In this model with community risk, however, a 
simple mechanism can eliminate bank panics. The 
mechanism involves an inferior technology: the so-
called liquid, or reserves; technology. Recall that this 
technology produces one unit of output in the next 
period from one unit of investment in the current per-
iod. I assume that in the planning period the amount 
invested by each community in the reserves technology 
is observable. Say that each community agrees to invest 
a fraction t of its resources in the reserves technology 
(where t still equals pxtx + p2t2). Depositors who with-
draw in the intermediate period receive jc, units, and 
those who withdraw later receive JC2 units, where the 
pair (JC,,JC2) solves the programming problem in the 
Diamond and Dybvig economy without aggregate risk. 
All communities agree to borrow and lend at the inter-
est rate x2/xx in the intermediate period. (Recall that 
x2 > JC, , so that JC2/JC, > 1.) 
I argue that this agreement is incentive compatible. 
Any community which has tx withdrawers is happy to 
lend its remaining reserves at this interest rate, and 
communities which have t2 withdrawers borrow at this 
11 interest rate. If the demand for withdrawals exceeds the 
supply of funds—that is, if more than a fraction t of 
individuals in the entire economy chooses to withdraw— 
then convertibility is suspended. Given this arrange-
ment, it is clear that the allocations are feasible and 
incentive compatible and do not involve bank panics. 
This risk-sharing arrangement yields the best pos-
sible outcomes and avoids bank panics. It depends very 
heavily on the observability of investment in the re-
serves technology. Every community has an incentive 
to invest entirely in the illiquid technology and borrow 
at x2/xx in the marketplace because x2/x{ < R. So if 
good outcomes are to be sustained, there must be some 
means of collectively enforcing adequate investment in 
the reserves technology. 
... And Formally 
Here I present a detailed technical description and 
analysis of the models with aggregate and community 
risk. 
The Model With Aggregate Risk 
The model with aggregate risk has three periods— 
labeled 0, 1, and 2—with one good per period. The 
periods are referred to as the planning, intermediate, and 
final periods, respectively. The economy has N people, 
and each person is endowed with one unit of the 
planning period good. 
• Technology 
All production occurs at a central location, and every-
one in the economy has access to two technologies. 
One is the illiquid technology. I denote the illiquid 
technology set by Y. Let yt be an output (if negative, an 
input) of the period f good. The triplet (y0,yvy2)is in 
the illiquid technology set if it equals (—y, Xy, R( 1 — X)y) 
for some y > 0 and all X e [0, 1 ]. Here, the investment in 
the planning period is y; a fraction X of the investment is 
withdrawn in the intermediate period, yielding an 
output of Xy; and the remainder is withdrawn in the 
final period and returns /?(1 — k)y. I assume that R> 1. 
The other technology is, of course, liquid. The liquid 
technology set, denoted by L, is described by the trip-
let (/0, Zp l2) = (-/, XIX1-A)/) for some / > 0 and all 
X e [0, 1]. The liquid technology yields one unit of the 
good in either period for each unit of the investment. 
Notice that the illiquid technology dominates the 
liquid technology. 
• Preferences 
People in this economy care only about consumption ct 
in the intermediate and final periods. Each person is one 
of two types. Type 1 people, whom I shall also call 
impatient, have preferences given by the utility function 
w(c, + <5c2), where <5 is close to zero. Type 2 people, also 
called patient, have preferences given by the utility 
function w(c, + c2). I assume that the utility function 
displays relative risk aversion greater than unity; that is, 
—cU"(c)/U'(c) > 1. An example of a utility function 
satisfying this condition is c
l~
a/(\—a)
 for a > 1. An 
example of one failing to satisfy the condition is log c. I 
also assume that limr_0£/'(c) = oo 
The fraction of the population that is Type 1 is a 
random variable which takes on one of two values, tx or 
t2, where 0<r, </2< 1, with probability /?, and /?2, 
respectively. Individuals learn their own type at the 
beginning of the intermediate period. Therefore, during 
the planning period, all people are identical. Each 
person seeks to maximize the expected utility of 
consumption. 
• Information 
Although people learn their own types, no one else does. 
A person's type is private information. 
• Isolation 
In the intermediate period, people are isolated from 
each other, but each person can choose to contact the 
central location at which all production occurs. The 
decision to contact the production location must be 
made at the beginning of the intermediate period. This 
decision is private information to each person. Once 
people have made this decision, they arrive at the 
production location at some random instant during the 
intermediate period. They consume as soon as they 
arrive there. People arrive at the production location at 
a constant rate of one person per unit of time, indepen-
dent of the number of people who have chosen to 
contact the production location.
5 Once the stock of 
contacting people is exhausted, the arrival rate drops to 
zero. 
The constant arrival rate implies that the aggregate 
state of the economy cannot be inferred from the arrival 
rate. Because I assume that people arrive at the produc-
tion location randomly and because they consume the 
instant they arrive, I preclude the possibility of setting 
up a credit market in the intermediate period. I make 
5 As an example of this sort of constant arrival rate, think of people traveling 
to the production location on a crowded highway which they enter from several 
ramps. Each entrance ramp allows only one car per green light. Thus, the arrival 
rate is independent of the number of people in line. 
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this assumption to capture the notion that a demand 
deposit provides the holder with the ability to withdraw 
at any time. The assumption is also consistent with the 
notion that people hold liquid assets because they may 
need to consume at times and places at which accessing 
asset markets is difficult or costly. 
• Sequential Service 
The period 0 investment can be made collectively, by a 
group (or all) of the individuals. The amount invested 
grows according to the technology. A programmable 
robot acts like a cash machine in this economy. It makes 
payments to withdrawers in periods 1 and 2 and can 
check a person's account to make sure that person is 
entitled to make a withdrawal. Payments to individuals 
can depend only on the number of people who have 
previously withdrawn, not on the number of prospective 
withdrawers. I call this last assumption the sequential 
service constraint. In the Appendix, I describe a class of 
environments for which every efficient mechanism 
respects the sequential service constraint.
6 
• Efficient Outcomes 
Here I analyze efficient outcomes in the model with 
aggregate risk. Efficient outcomes are those which 
maximize expected utility over the planning period 
subject to the technology and information constraints. I 
restrict attention to symmetric efficient outcomes, those 
which treat everybody in period 0 the same. 
I now describe the space of allocations. At the 
beginning of period 1, after types are realized, people 
must decide whether or not to visit the production 
location. Let Vi be an indicator variable which indicates 
whether or not a person of Type i—where i= 1,2— 
visits the production location, and let = 0 indicate a 
decision to visit and Vt'•= 1, a decision not to visit. Once 
a decision to visit is made, people arrive at the pro-
duction location randomly and announce their types 
(possibly falsely). Payments to a person in the interme-
diate period can depend only on the number of reported 
Type 1 predecessors and on that person's reported type. 
Denote the number of predecessors by s, the reported 
type of a person by i, and the payment in period 1 by 
JC,(/, s). In the final period, the aggregate number of 
people reporting as Type 1 in the intermediate period is 
also known. Denote the payment function in the final 
period by x2(i, s, t). The space of allocations is, then, a 
pair of numbers (V,, V2\ which represent decisions to 
visit the production location for each type, and a pair of 
consumption allocation functions (x,(/, s), x2(i} s, t)). 
Here I focus on the case where only Type 1 people 
visit the production location. (In the Appendix, I show 
that an allocation mechanism with this property is 
efficient for a class of environments.) Of course, if only 
Type 1 people visit, then Type 2 people consume noth-
ing in the intermediate period. From this fact, it also 
follows that Type 2 people receive payments in the final 
period which take on one of two values, depending on 
the number of Type 1 withdrawals in the intermediate 
period. I denote payments to Type 2 people in the final 
period, when the number of Type 1 people is t{ orf2,by 
x2l and JC22. 
The resource constraints are, then, written this way: 
(11) fo
lxl(l,s)ds 





 t2) ds + (1—r2)jc22] = 1 
(13) x{>0 
(14) jt2 > 0. 
Equation (11) is the resource constraint if the number 
of Type 1 people is tx. The first term on the left is the 
sum of payments to Type 1 people in period 1. The term 
in the brackets is the sum of payments to Type 1 and 
Type 2 people in period 2, the final period. Note that 
payments in period 1 can depend only on the number 
of predecessors, denoted s. But payments in period 2 
can depend both on when a person shows up at the 
production location and on the aggregate number of 
Type 1 people. Equation (12) is the resource constraint 
in state t2. Equations (13) and (14) embody the as-
sumption that people's endowments are zero in periods 
1 and 2. 
The expected utility of a typical person in the 
planning period is given by 
6 An efficient mechanism is one which yields highest planning period utility 
among all mechanisms which respect the information and technology restric-
tions on the economy. You may wonder whether any mechanisms which 
respect the isolation assumption fail to respect the sequential service constraint. 
There is at least one such mechanism. It requires everybody to show up at the 
production location and report their type on arrival. Even though the arrival rate 
is constant, in a truth-telling equilibrium, it is possible very early in period 1 to 
infer the relative proportions of patient and impatient types in the population 
and, therefore, the aggregate state of the economy. This kind of mechanism can 
be ruled out by imposing a small cost of traveling to the production location. I 
impose such a cost in the environment described in the Appendix. 
13 (15) U(x{,x2) = px [/0'' U(xj(1,5) ~b &c2( 1,5, tx)) 
+ (l-f1)tf(jt21)] 
+ Pi [/0'
2^(*i(l,s) + &x2(l,s, t2))ds 
+ (\-t2)U(x22)l 
Consider now the problem of maximizing (15) 
subject to (11)—(14). The properties of the solution are 
easily established by studying three of the first-order 
conditions. For 5 e [0, ], the first-order condition with 
respect to xx(l,s) is 
(16) pxU'Qcla9s) + 8x2(l,s,tl)) 
+ p2U'(xx(l9s) + 5x2(l,s, tx))-Xx <0. 
Condition (16) holds with strict equality ifXj(l,s) > 0. 
The Lagrange multiplier X, is that associated with con-
straint (11). The first-order condition with respect to 
x2(l,s, tx) forse [0,tx] is 
(17) px8U'(x{(l, s) + dx2( 1, s, tx)) - (kx/R) < 0. 
Condition (17) holds with strict equality if x2(\,s, tx) 
> 0. An immediate implication of (16) and (17) is that if 
8< \/R, then Jt2(l,s, r1) = 0. Similarly,Jt2(l,s, f2) = 0. 
Therefore, as is to be expected, Type 1 people consume 
nothing in the final period when 8 is sufficiently small. 
So, in what follows, I will set these variables equal to 
zero. 
With respect to xx(l,s) for s e [tx, t2], the following 
condition holds [again, with strict equality if Jtj(l,s) 
>0]: 
(18) p2U'(xx(\, s)) — \2< 0 
where X2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
constraint (12). Given the assumption that the marginal 
utility of consumption goes to infinity as consumption 
goes to zero, (16) and (18) hold with equality. An 
immediate implication of (16) and (18) is that xx(l,s) 
is constant for 5 e [0, tx] and also for s e [tx,t2]. That is, 
Type 1 people who arrive at the production location 
with tx or fewer predecessors receive a constant pay-
ment—say, xxx—and those who arrive with more than 
tx predecessors receive another constant payment—say, 
X\2' 
We can also write the first-order conditions fox x2X 
and x22.1 collect all the first-order conditions and write 
them as follows: 
(19) U\xx j)
 = p2 U\xx2) + pxRU\x2,) 
(20) U'(X22) = RU'(XX2). 
Equations (11), (12), (19), and (20) uniquely charac-
terize the solution to the maximization problem. The 
properties of this solution can be understood by looking 
at some special cases. Let the utility function be 
x
l~y/( 1 — 7) with 7 > 1, and letp2 be very close to zero. 
Then the solution is (approximately) given by 
(21) jcf^ - Rx2Xy 
(22) x22y « Rxny. 
From equations (11) and (12), it is straightforward to 
show that 
(23) x22 ~xxx(l-tx)R"im 
+ [(T2-TX)R-"y + (\-T2)/R\. 
It is possible to find parameter values with the property 
that jc22 < xxx. For example, an economy with R= 4, 
tx = 1 /2, and t2 = 3/4 has this property. This possibility 
will be important when I turn to the issue of bank 
panics. 
Before doing that, I need to verify that the solution is 
incentive compatible, or that Type 2 people do not have 
an incentive to visit the production location in period 1. 
I show that incentive compatibility is satisfied if p2 is 
sufficiently small. Notice from (19) that in such a case 
U\xxx) ~ RU'(X2j) > UXx2x). Since U\-) is decreasing, 
xxx < jt21.Then, with p2 sufficiently small, by visiting 
the production location, Type 2 people would trade an 
almost sure return of x2x for a smaller return of xxx. 
Therefore, Type 2 people do not visit the production 
location, and the allocation is incentive compatible. 
I turn now to the possibility of multiple equilibria 
given this allocation mechanism. To recapitulate, the 
mechanism specifies a payment of xxx to the first tx 
withdrawers, xx2 to the next t2 — tx withdrawers, and 
zero thereafter. If there are t2 withdrawers, those who 
do not withdraw receive jc22 in the final period. Suppose 
now that everybody believes that everybody else will 
attempt to withdraw. Suppose each person adopts the 
following strategy: Visit the production location, and if 
the current payment rate is xxx, withdraw; if it is xX2 or 
zero, do not withdraw. By following this strategy, a 
person can be assured of at least a payment ofx22 in the 
final period, and if the person is lucky, a payment ofxxx. 
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I have demonstrated that there are economies for 
which xxx >x22. Therefore, for such economies, multi-
ple equilibria in the form of bank panics are possible.
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To summarize this section on the model with 
aggregate risk, I have 
•Constructed an explicit model in which sequential 
service is an essential ingredient of the description 
of the technology. 
•Solved for the optimal contract for such a model 
and shown that multiple equilibria are possible. 
•Modeled sequential service so that credit markets 
are ruled out in the intermediate period. 
The Model With Community Risk 
Now let's replicate the aggregate-risk economy many 
times, so that we have a large number of communities, 
each of which is exactly like the aggregate-risk 
economy. Think of these communities as uniformly 
distributed over the interval [0,1 ]. Assume that a law 
of large numbers holds, so that /?, and p2 are now 
interpreted as the fraction of communities with tx and t2 
Type 1 people, respectively. 
Within each community, the technology is the same 
as that described above. Also assume that the period 0 
good is specific to each community and cannot be 
transported across communities. However, the period 1 
and 2 goods can be shipped across communities. 
Assume, as well, that the amount invested in each 
technology is not observable. 
The community information and isolation assump-
tions are also the same as the aggregate assumptions 
described earlier. In addition, assume that people 
cannot cross community boundaries. The realization of 
the number of Type 1 people is not observable across 
communities, and the consumption of any person is not 
observable to anyone else. 
Within each community, assume that a local planner 
chooses allocation functions. These functions are un-
observable to other local planners. What is observable 
is the net amount of period 1 and 2 goods shipped to 
a community. The amounts shipped are functions of 
the reported type of a community. Let (Mx(tx), 
Mx(t2), M2(tx), M2(t2)) be the intercommunity transfer 
functions, where Mx(tx) denotes the amount shipped 
(possibly negative) to a community in period 1 if it 
reports tx Type 1 people; Mx(t2), the amount shipped to 
a community in period 1 if it reports t2 Type 1 people; 
and so on. Resource feasibility requires that 
(24) pxMx(tx)+p2Mx(t2)
 = 0 
(25) pxM2(tx)+p2M2(t2)
 = 0. 
In the economy with aggregate risk, we could safely 
assume that there was no investment in the liquid 
technology since it was dominated in return. For now, 
continue to assume that no community invests in the 
liquid technology; later I will argue that no community 
would choose to invest in this technology. Given this 
assumption, the resource constraints in each com-
munity are 
(26) (\~tx)x2x = R[(l-tx)xxx + Mx(tx)] - M2(tx) 
(27) (1 ~t2)x22 = - (t2~tx)xx2 + Mx(t2)] 
~ M2(t2). 
The left sides of (26) and (27) are period 2 payments. 
On the right sides, the terms in the brackets are the 
amounts left over after payments to Type 1 people and 
shipments from other communities.
8 
Given the intercommunity transfer functions Mx and 
M2, the problem faced by each local planner is to max-
imize expected utility of the community residents sub-
ject to the resource constraints (26) and (27) and the 
information and incentive constraints. 
I now argue that this is necessarily true: 
(28) RMx(tx) - M2(tx) = RMx(t2) - M2(t2) = 0. 
Equation (28) has the nice interpretation that the 
interest rate for intercommunity borrowing and lending 
must be R. Note that Mx(tx) is the amount loaned (if 
positive) in period 1 and M2(tx) is the amount repaid by 
borrowers in period 2. The ratio is R. 
To see this result, suppose that RMx(tx) — M2(tx) < 0. 
Then, from (24) and (25), RMx(t2) - M2(t2) > 0. Now 
consider the following strategy for a community. Re-
gardless of the true state, report that the state is t2. Since 
RMx(tx) - M2(tx) < RMx(t2) — M2(t2\ we can introduce 
some slack into a resource constraint (26) and increase 
payments to Type 2 people. Therefore, such an alloca-
tion is not incentive compatible. A similar argument 
7 Of course, I have not explicitly modeled sunspots or other features which 
trigger the bad equilibrium outcome. For further discussion of this issue, see 
Postlewaite and Vives 1987. In particular, if the probability of bank panics is 
high, then people might choose not to set up any collective arrangement. 
8Strictly speaking, this way of writing the resource constraint is consistent 
with the goods-in-process aspect of the technology only under the assumption 
that goods invested in period 0 continue to grow at rate R into period 2 no matter 
where they are shipped, as long as they are not consumed. 
15 establishes that if RMx(tx) — M2(tx)> 0, then the alloca-
tion is not incentive compatible. We have the desired 
result. 
Clearly, intercommunity borrowing and lending is a 
technology with exactly the same properties as the 
illiquid technology. The problem of the local planners is 
exactly the same as the problem in the economy with 
aggregate risk. It should also be clear that the liquid 
technology will not be used in any essential way. Since 
investments in this technology are unobservable and 
since the intercommunity interest rate cannot be dif-
ferent from R, no community invests in this technology. 
Now let's make one change in the community-risk 
economy. Assume that the amount invested in the liquid 
technology by each community is observable. Retain all 
the other assumptions. I will argue that there is a mech-
anism which implements the full-information alloca-
tions. That is, it will produce the same allocations as the 
best mechanism in an economy where the types of all 
people are observable and people are not isolated. 
To show this result, I first describe the full-informa-
tion allocations. Since there is no aggregate risk in this 
economy, the fraction of Type 1 people equals pxtx + 
p2t2, which I denote by t. The problem is to maximize 
expected utility subject to the resource constraints. 
Clearly, Type 1 people will not consume in period 2, 
and it is easy to show that Type 2 people will not 
consume in period 1. Therefore, the problem is to 
(29) max tU(x{) + (l~t)U(x2) 
subject to 
(30) txx +(l-t)(x2/R)= 1. 
This is exactly the problem Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) studied. Because the relative risk aversion of the 
utility function is greater than unity, the optimal allo-
cation satisfies 
(31) jc,<JC2 
(32) x2/xx < R. 
Now consider the following mechanism. Each com-
munity invests an amount txx (per capita) in the liquid 
technology. All communities can borrow and lend in 
the intermediate period at an interest rate x2/xx. Each 
community promises to pay JCj units to those who with-
draw in period 1 and x2 units to those remaining in 
period 2. I claim that these allocations are incentive 
compatible. 
Consider the problem faced by a community which 
has promised to pay jc, and x2 and is faced with t2 Type 1 
people. It pays off the first t Type 1 people from the 
liquid technology. It borrows (t2 — t)xx in the market to 
pay off the remaining Type 1 people. In period 2, the 
illiquid technology yields R(\ — txx) units of output, out 
of which it pays x2 units to each of its (1 ~t2) Type 2 
people and (t2~t)x2 to its lenders. Since, from (30), 
R(\ — txx) = (1 —r)jc2, this transaction is feasible. This 
argument also shows that, with any other borrowing (or 
lending) strategy, the community will be unable to 
meet its commitments to its people. 
To complete the argument, we should ask whether 
any local planner would benefit by choosing different 
allocations than the pair (jc,,jc2). But recall that these 
allocations yield the highest utility in the class of all 
mechanisms. Therefore, no planner would choose any-
thing else. An important point, I repeat, is the observa-
bility of investment in the liquid technology. If this 
investment were not observable, every community 
would be better off by not investing in the liquid tech-
nology and then borrowing, if needed, at the interest 
rate x2/xx in the marketplace. Lastly, I address the 
multiple equilibrium problem. It should be clear that a 
policy of suspension of convertibility if all communities 
wish to borrow eliminates panics since, from (31), 
X2>X\-
Summary and Policy Implications 
In this paper I have constructed a series of models of 
bank panics. The substantive contribution is to show 
that such a model can be constructed with rational, 
optimizing people. The technical contribution is to 
construct a model in which sequential service is a 
central property of an efficient mechanism rather than 
an unmodeled imposition upon otherwise efficient 
arrangements. The resulting model was constructed to 
capture two key features of the U.S. National Banking 
System: the limits on bank branching and the ability of 
banks to circumvent reserve requirements. These fea-
tures meant that the interbank borrowing and lending 
market did not function very well. The result was that 
banks could not diversify away withdrawal risk. There-
fore, banks were susceptible to runs and the banking 
system, to panics. 
A central feature of the National Banking System is 
that it inhibited portfolio diversification, on both the 
asset and the liability sides of bank balance sheets. 
Jagannathan and I (Chari and Jagannathan 1988) and 
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Williamson (in this issue) have argued that what 
matters for bank runs is the failure to diversify risk on 
the asset side. I have argued here that what matters is, 
rather, the failure to diversify withdrawal risk. What 
made me change my mind was the fact that the rate of 
bank failure has been remarkably low since the onset of 
deposit insurance (Williamson, this issue). If risk on the 
asset side were so important, that insurance would have 
made little difference to the rate of bank failure. 
In this paper, I have shown that efficient outcomes 
can be sustained by an appropriate choice of reserve 
requirements and by a well-functioning interbank 
borrowing and lending market. I will argue further here 
that an effective central bank is also likely to be 
necessary. For one thing, conditions and the appropri-
ate level of reserves change over time. (In the model, 
think of the aggregate number of Type 1 people 
changing.) If reserve requirements were set legisla-
tively, changing them would take quite a bit of time. 
Therefore, delegating the task to a central bank might 
be preferable. 
Furthermore, the model suggests that the central 
bank's discount window policy plays a key role in 
promoting efficient banking arrangements and prevent-
ing bank panics. To understand the role played by the 
discount window in the model, suppose that all banks 
maintain their reserves at the central bank. In the 
intermediate period, the central bank promises to lend 
at a gross interest rate of x2/xx against assets which 
mature in the final period. Note that this interest rate is 
higher than the gross rate of return on reserves (which is 
unity), but lower than the rate of return on the secured 
assets (which is R). Therefore, the central bank seems to 
be subsidizing banks by allowing borrowing at the 
discount window at below-market interest rates. Here, 
appearances do not deceive. The central bank provides 
an important insurance role by allowing such below-
market borrowing. The premium for this insurance 
contract is paid in the form of reserves held at the 
central bank. I have argued that such a mechanism is 
efficient and can eliminate bank panics. In addition, 
central banks today can create reserves by printing 
money. Therefore, a promise by the central bank to lend 
unlimited amounts against sound assets is credible. In 
this sense, central banks can prevent panics arising 
from a lack of confidence in the banking system. 
The advantages of using these central bank policies 
instead of deposit insurance should be obvious. Deposit 
insurance creates moral hazard problems that can be 
mitigated only by regulations which effectively reduce 
bank risk-taking. The appropriate amount of risk for 
banks is hard to measure and harder to enforce. 
Lending by the central bank of the kind discussed here 
is not subject to the same sorts of moral hazard 
problems, for two reasons. One is that, to the extent such 
lending is done against sound assets, it does not 
subsidize risk-taking. The other reason is that, since 
depositors are not insured, they have an incentive to 
monitor banks to ensure that they don't take excessive 
risk. Monitoring by depositors rather than by regulators 
is desirable because it generally allows for greater 
diversity in risk among banks. Depositors could choose 
among banks which offer different menus of risk versus 
return. Such a choice is effectively denied by the current 
system. 
I have thus far not mentioned the well-known U.S. 
bank panics between 1929 and 1933. These panics, I 
think, are best explained by Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963), who blame the Federal Reserve System for not 
suspending convertibility until it was too late. Re-
member that in my model, as in Diamond and Dybvig's 
(1983), suspension is an essential component of the 
efficient arrangement; if there are legal constraints 
against suspension, panics can occur. 
Some may argue that the considerations I have ad-
vanced are purely theoretical and that policy reforms 
such as eliminating deposit insurance would return us to 
the National Banking System. But were conditions 
under that system so terrible? Recall, for example, that, 
during the panics of that period, the currency premium 
was roughly 2 percent. Today, a 2 percent loss of wealth 
in the U.S. stock market is a 50 point decline in the Dow 
Jones industrial average. While this kind of decline does 
not occur everyday, when it does, we certainly do not 
call it a panic or rush to reform the stock market. To put 
the matter somewhat differently, three times in 50 years 
the National Banking System imposed on depositors a 
loss of about 2 percent. Did that system perform so 
much worse than the current system does? 
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On the Optimality of Sequential Service Mechanisms 
Three questions naturally arise from the models in the 
preceding paper: 
•What are the allocations when both types of people visit 
the production location but payments depend only on the 
number of Type 1 predecessors? 
•Why do the payments depend only on the number of Type 
1 predecessors rather than, say, the relative numbers of 
predecessors of each type? 
•Why must people consume as soon as they arrive at the 
production location? Why not have everybody wait to 
consume until the total number of Type 1 people is 
known? 
I answer these questions here. 
What Are the Allocations When Both Types Visit? 
Consider the allocations when both types of people visit the 
production location. As in the paper, here payments can 
depend only on the person's reported type and the number of 
predecessors reporting they are Type 1. I now develop the 
resource constraints when the state is tx. Recall that people 
arrive at a uniform rate of unity at the production location. At 
some instant r in calendar time, the fraction of Type 1 people 
is f, and the fraction of Type 2 people is 1 — f,. The number of 
Type 1 predecessors is rr,. Therefore, total payments at instant 
r are given by txxx(\,rtx) + (1—/,)jc,(2, rf,). Therefore, pay-
ments to all people in period 1 are given by /o[r,x,(l,rr,) + 
(l-f,)jc,(2 ,rr,)]</r. 
A change in the variables, so that s = rt{, makes this the 
resource constraint in state r,: 
(Al) 0^,(1,j) + (1-^)^,(2,5)] ds/U 
+ R~1 {/J1 [/,Jt2(f,) + (1—f,)JC2(2,5, tx)] ds/t{} = 1. 
Note that s denotes the number of Type 1 predecessors. 
Similarly, the resource constraint in state t2 becomes this: 
(A2) ft[t2xx(\,s) + (1-^,(2,5)] ds/t2 
+ R-
1 {/0
/2[t2x2( 1,5, t2) + (1 •-t2)x2(2,5, t2)] ds/t2}= 1. 
The expected utility of a typical person in the planning period 
is 
(A3) U(xx, x2) = 2 Afo/o fri(U) + a*2(l, j, *,-)] ds/t, 
+ (1 -t^Uix^s) + x2(2, s, 0) ds/tj}. 
I turn now to the incentive-compatibility constraints. If 
people know the time at which they themselves arrive, then 
they also know that t = t2 if s>f,. However, if se [0, f,], then 
people perceive the probabilities that t=t\ and t=t2 as pl and 
p2, respectively. Therefore, we have the following incentive 
constraints: If s e [fhf2]» then 
(A4) £/(*,(l,s) + 8x2(\,s,t2)) > U(xx(2,s) + 8x2(2,s,t2)) 
(A5) U(x](2,s) + jc2(2,t2)) > U(xx(1,s) + x2( 1,t2)). 
And if 5 e [0,r, J, then 
(A6) 2 Pi[U(x{(Us) + &x2(Us9ti))] 
> 2 Pj[U(x\(2,s) + 8X2(2,S, /,))] 
(A7) 2 p{[U(xla,s) + x2(2,s,ti))] 
> 2 pj[U(xi(\,s) -h x2(l,5, tj))]. 
An allocation (JC,,JC2) is efficient if it maximizes (A3) 
subject to (A 1), (A2), and (A4)-(A7). It is straightforward to 
show that, if p2 is sufficiently small, then the allocations 
described in the paper are efficient. Therefore, requiring that 
all people visit the production location does not alter the set 
of efficient allocations. These allocations obviously domi-
nate the allocations if only Type 2 people are required to visit 
the production location and coincide with the efficient allo-
cations if only Type 1 people are required to visit the produc-
tion location. 
The key assumption here is that allocations depend only on 
the number of Type 1 predecessors. If requiring all people to 
visit is costless and the allocations are incentive compatible, 
then the relative proportions of the two types can be 
uncovered within a very short time at the beginning of the 
period. Since the state of the economy is then known, the 
sequential service constraint need not be respected. There-
fore, I modify the economy in a small way and show that 
efficient allocations in the modified economy require only 
Type 1 people to visit. 
Why Does Only Type 1 Visit? 
Suppose that traveling to the production location has a small 
cost, e. Let (jcf,jc|) denote the allocations which respect se-
quential service. Then expected utility under the efficient 
sequential service mechanism is given by 
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(A8) V = p,U,y(xf1) + (l-rI)t/(jrfl)J-p^e 
+ p2[t, l/(jtf,) + (r2- r, )t/(jcf2) + (1 -t2)U( xk) J 
- p2t2t. 
Consider now the set of allocations that are realized if the 
state of nature becomes known in an infinitesimal time at the 
beginning of period 1. Denote these allocations by x{(t{), 
jc,(M, x2(t2). Expected utility under this mechanism is 
given by 
(A9) U
k = p\txU(xx (f,)) + (1 -tl)U(x2(tl))]-Pie 
+ p2[t2U(xx(t2)) + (\-t2)U(x2(t2))]~p2e. 
Note that under this mechanism, everybody visits the pro-
duction location. Given that we are here restricted to non-
randomized visit decisions, the only way to uncover the ag-
gregate state is to require that everybody visit. 
Suppose now that p2 equals zero. Clearly, U
s > U
k. 




Why Not Wait to Consume? 
The last issue addressed here is the requirement that consump-
tion occur immediately on arrival at the production location. I 
address this issue by modifying preferences so that efficiency 
requires immediate consumption. Suppose that the prefer-
ences of Type 1 people are now given by U( fd(r)cx(r) + dc2), 
where c,(r) denotes consumption at instant r in period 1, c2 
denotes consumption in period 2, and 8(r) is a decreasing 
function. If 8(r) decreases rapidly enough, consuming as early 
as possible will be efficient. Since consumption cannot occur 
before arrival at the production location, consuming as early 
as possible once a person arrives there is efficient. 
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